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Abstract: The paper discusses two main features of Climate Change: its technicality 
and the centrality of the development issue. Framed within the general approach of 
political ecology, which analyses the relationship between environmental issues and 
political, economic and social factors, it argues that a managerial discourse has 
become hegemonic in the Climate Change domain. To explain this dominance, it is 
necessary to tum to the macro-discourse of development (a highly technical one 
itself) and to draw parallels between the development and the environment fields, 
both of them having been linked through the sustainable development discourse. 
International climate politics has indeed to be understood in the context of the 
global debate on development and of North-South relations. The paper also 
highlights an emerging paradox between the presumptions on which the aid regime 
is based on the one hand, and the industrialised countries' stances regarding 
developing countries' emission reduction efforts on the other hand. The North-
South divide and the question of development were not as visible during the Cancun 
conference, but they will remain a determining factor of the future climate 
negotiations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2009, 40,000 people gathered in Copenhagen for the United Nations 
Conference on Climate Change. The Conference ended up in a Summit, with the 
presence of over II 0 Heads of State or government. This unprecedented number of 
people and world leaders (which exceeded previous conferences, including the Rio 
Earth Summit and the Bali Conference) reflects the importance of the challenges to 
be met and the high expectations people had. The 15th Conference of the Parties 
(COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which also served as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 
was supposed to decide on a new deal to be implemented after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in 20I2. Expected as an achievement, the 
outcome of the Conference was finally described as a "new start" and engendered 
frustration and discontents. Reasons for the failure have been attributed to 
multilateralism and the consensus rule, as well as to the reluctance of major actors to 
cooperate, in particular the United States and China, and the conflicting interests and 
positions between industrialised and developing countries (Christoff, 20 I 0; 
Dimitrov, 2010). The North-South divide has been at the very heart of the 
negotiations. The organisation ofthe conference itself reflected the conflicting views 
of industrialised and developing countries, with parallel discussions on two lines of 
negotiations. One consisted in maintaining and amending the Kyoto Protocol, which 
does not require emission reduction by developing countries (supported by the 
latter). The other one consisted in negotiating a new deal (supported by 
industrialised countries). The two options were discussed at the same time, which 
made the discussions a bit chaotic and further highlighted the scission between these 
two groups of countries. At the opposite, COP 16, organised in Cancun in 2010, has 
been described as a success. It managed to restore trust and resulted in the adoption 
of the Cancun agreements. The Conference made progress on the reduction of 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and on carbon stock (REDD+ ), 
on the monitoring, reporting and verification of emission reduction (MRV), and on 
the financing mechanism to support developing countries affected by Climate 
Change (Green Climate Fund). These achievements can be explained by several 
elements. Firstly, expectations were so low after COP15 that any outcome would 
have been seen as positive. Secondly, countries did not have any other choice but 
agreeing on something if they did not want to lose face, and another failure would 
have proclaimed for good the end of multilateralism in climate negotiations. Thirdly, 
the process was transparent and inclusive (while the Danish presidency was highly 
criticized for its lack of transparency and neutrality during COP15). Fourthly, 
COP16 focused on technical issues and avoided political and contentious 
discussions. That said, development and North-South relations are still at the core of 
Climate Change politics. This paper discusses two main features of Climate Change: 
its technicality and the centrality ofthe development issue. These two characteristics 
are closely linked and also constitute key elements of sustainable development and 
international environmental politics. It argues that a managerial discourse has 
become hegemonic in the Climate Change domain. To explain this dominance, it is 
necessary to tum to the macro-discourse of development (a highly technical one 
itself) and to draw parallels between the development and the environment fields, 
both of them having been linked through the sustainable development discourse. 
International climate politics has indeed to be understood in the context ofthe global 
debate on development and of North-South relations. After discussing the 
technicality in both the 'development and environment' and the Climate Change 
discourses, the relationship between Climate Change and development is explored 
as well as its impact on climate policy. 
2.APPROACH 
This paper links the dominant Climate Change discourse to development to provide 
a new light on its understanding. While most studies discuss the representation of 
Climate Change in the media (Carvalho, 2007; Boykoff, 2008) or the role played by 
fear (Risbey, 2008; Hulme, 2008), the analysis contributes to the debate on the ideas 
behind global environmental discourses, following Crist (2007), Backstrand and 
Lovbrand (2006) and Adger et al. (2001). The aim of the paper is to explore the 
North-South divide, and the very question of development. It discusses two features 
of Climate Change politics: First, its technicality, which results from the 
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development discourse which is a highly technical one itself, and from the fact that 
development and environment have always been linked; second, development, 
which is at the core of Climate Change and Climate Change politics. 
The analysis is framed within the general approach of political ecology. 
Political ecology analyses the relationship between environmental issues and 
political, economic and social factors. For Robbins, political ecology has a 
"normative understanding that there are very likely better, less coercive, less 
exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing things" (2004, 12). It considers 
other ways of representing social facts, implying that other practices are possible, 
and aims at unravelling the complexity surrounding environmental issues. It is also 
interested in power relations and their impacts on the way the environment is 
treated: "Politics is inevitably ecological and [ ... ] ecology is inherently political" 
(Robbins, 2004: xvi-xvii). Political ecology precisely seeks to "understand the 
political dynamics surrounding material and discursive struggles over the 
environment" (Bryant, 1998: 89). It tries to articulate the natural as constitutive of 
the social, and the social as constitutive of the natural (Goldman and Schurman, 
2000: 568). 
The section on the technicality of development and the environment is based 
on the observation of the development practice and climate policy and of the 
historical evolution of the concept of development. The discussion on the North-
South divide focuses on the Copenhagen and Cancun conferences, and on the 
statements pronounced during COP16's High Level Segment in particular. A strong 
emphasis is put on the World Bank throughout the paper because of the role it plays 
in both development and climate politics (largest multilateral development actor and 
trustee of the Green Climate Fund). 
3. DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND TECHNICALITY 
3.1 Development and the Environment: Two Faces of the Same Coin 
Discourses are ways of representing areas of knowledge and social practice 
(Fairclough, 1992: 3). Social phenomena result from particular representations of 
what reality is or should be. The way reality and facts are interpreted and 
represented, and the acceptation of such representations by the whole society, are 
then crucial in terms of the resulting social practices and social change. According to 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985), there is a confrontation between discourses to gain the 
hegemony in the capacity of establishing the meanings of things. Adger et al. (2001) 
identifies two major discourses in the Climate Change domain, namely a managerial 
one (which is dominant and reflects on the international politics) and a profligacy 
one (represented by NGOs such as the Climate Action Network), which advocates 
preventive actions and a new economic order instead of technical solutions. 
Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) show that the ecological modernization discourse 
is prominent in climate governance, as illustrated by the carbon market developed 
through the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) 
distinguish between four worldviews on global environmental change: market 
liberals, institutionalists, bioenvironmentalists, and social greens. The two first ones 
are the most influential ones, while the two last ones are critical of globalisation, 
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overconsumption and large-scale industrial life that they foresee as the cause of 
global environment problems. For Crist (2007: 33-34), framing Climate Change as 
"the most urgent problem we face" would encourage the idea that the required 
approaches are those which directly address the problem, implying the adoption of 
technical solutions only. She denounces the narrow character of the solutions 
advocated so far (such as reviving nuclear power, improving wind turbines, 
increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use or capturing carbon dioxide), which 
would leave the root causes of the environmental crisis unaddressed. 
The prominence of the technical interpretation of global environmental 
problems comes from the technicality of the development discourse. Development 
has always been defined and considered in technical terms, at least in its dominant 
acceptation. Despite an ongoing evolution of the consensus on development, its 
economic dimension has always been prominent and it has always been assessed in 
numerical terms and has echoed the idea that more is always better than less, 
associating accumulation, opulence and profit with both an objective and a norm. A 
social construction in itself, it has influenced the way environmental discourses have 
been shaped, as shown below. 
At the end of the 1940s, the world has been divided between developed and 
under-developed countries. The origin of the distinction between these two 
categories and the official and public apparition of the concept of "under-
development" is indeed attributed to President Truman's inaugural address in 1949, 
in which he mentions the need to assist underdeveloped areas: "Underdevelopment 
began, then, on January 20, 1949. On that day, two billion people became 
underdeveloped. [ ... ] They ceased being what they were [ ... ] and were 
transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others' reality" (Esteva, 1992, p. 7). 
According to Escobar, when in 1948 the World Bank rated countries as poor if their 
per capita income was below 100$, then two thirds of the world population became 
poor: "that the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution 
was economic growth and development became self-evident, necessary, and 
universal truths" (Escobar, 1995, p. 24). 
Technicality is then understood as a reality being reduced to simplified 
problems and terms, discarding any other (social, cultural) information that may call 
into question the definition of the problem and the solution offered. The reality is 
translated into a specific jargon and technical terms, as Catherine Caufield 
summarises in reference to the World Bank: "by translating complex and messy 
real-life problems into numerical terms that could be broken down and analyzed, the 
Bank's Washington experts could formulate solutions to problems in countries they 
hardly knew" (1998, p. 61). For example, the World Bank's approval documents 
outline development projects and justify the purpose of the intervention. They 
therefore present the region in which the projects take place. Virtually all these 
documents include an appendix setting out economic indicators (poverty, life 
expectancy, GDP, exports, share of private consumption, etc.). This technical data 
helps classify the country in relation to other countries in the same region and to 
other countries in "its11 category, of which the indicators are also presented. The 
emphasis on numerical data and the technical definition of problems and solutions is 
consistent with a lack of consideration for such nevertheless essential elements as 
social and political factors, which play an important role in a development process. 
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The development concept has obviously evolved so as to improve and to 
include all the components expected to lead to a better and satisfactory lifestyle 
worldwide, leading to the adoption of the comprehensive concept of sustainable 
development. However, development has broadly remained the same, and prefixes 
(human, participatory, sustainable, etc.) have been added to integrate new 
"fashionable" ideas, without engendering a profound paradigm shift (Germond-
Duret, 2009 and 2011). Professor Ravi Kanbur, from Cornell University, was 
appointed by the World Bank to write its 2000-2001 World Development Report. 
He resigned from this position after censorships attempts of sections on 
globalisation, which paved the way to a reflection on free-trade and political 
empowerment (APIC, 2000). Through his re-conceptualisation of poverty, Kanbur 
was introducing sociological considerations into the economy. This example shows 
the predominance of the economy in the development concept, despite a change in 
micro-discourses and the inclusion of new elements. 
The elaboration of the concept of human development, and of the human 
development index (HDI), is based on the pluri-dimension of poverty and represents 
in a sense a progress. However, the HDI remains a quantitative measure, with 
development thresholds, which allows categorizing who is poor and who is not, and 
a technical one, which does not fully reflect a given situation and people's feeling, 
while giving the impression it does. Furthermore, the HDI does not allow to take a 
fresh look at countries, as GDP per capita generally coincides with the HDI, GDP 
falling itself in the composition ofthe HDI, both directly (the GDP index accounting 
for one third of the HDI) and indirectly (relation between instruction and income, 
and relation between income and health spending). 
Today, development objectives have been split in a set of eight overarching 
goals, the Millennium Development Goals, which notably include poverty, hunger, 
gender, health and environment protection. Rist (2008) highlights the contradictions 
between these objectives and the means employed to achieve them. He notes that the 
2007 Report on the Millennium Development Goals indicates that the number of 
people living on less than one dollar a day has fallen significantly as a result of 
economic growth. But at the same time, inequalities have extended and the 
consumption share of the poorest 20 per cent has decreased. He denounces the 
division of "development" into distinct goals and the absence of thinking on their 
systematic linkage. For instance, the diminution in the number of poor people has 
been at the price of increased pollution and growing inequalities (Rist, 2008, p. 234). 
While one cannot deny a hegemonic macro-discourse of (economic) 
development, the micro-discourse of sustainable development has gained a 
hegemonic position itself: it is persistent, it is recognized and used by a variety of 
actors (local authorities, governments, international institutions, industries, academic 
institutions), it has been widely institutionalized and has social impacts not only in 
terms of policy formulation but also of the attention one has now to pay to the 
environment, in rhetoric at least. Its actual and systematic implementation is still to 
be proven, though, and the fact that so many different actors use this concept can be 
considered as suspect. For Fairman and Ross (1996), the sustainable development 
rhetoric does not reflect a real shift in beliefs and values, but is a symbolic answer to 
the lobbying by Northern environmental NGOs. In fact, the reflection on sustainable 
development came from the economy. The history of sustainable development is 
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indeed more than the history of environmentalism. It has to do with the relationship 
between economic development and the environment. 
The release of the Meadows report in 1972 is often considered as the first 
major step towards the idea of sustainable development (Meadows et al. , 1972). In 
addressing the question of population and natural resources, the report tackled the 
relationship between economy and the environment. One of its main ideas was that 
the industrial society was going to exceed most of the ecological limits within a 
matter of decades if it continued to promote the kind of economic growth witnessed 
in the 1960s and 1970s. It called for a rethinking of the content of economic growth. 
The same year, on the initiative of Sweden, the UN General Assembly decided to 
convene the first major UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. 
The Stockholm Conference witnessed a split between the industrialized and the 
developing world due to two conflicting ideas: Firstly, that the exploitation of 
natural resources by the North degraded the environment and contributed to the 
unequal distribution of wealth; and secondly, that environmental degradation 
resulted from a lack of development, that is to say from poverty. So economic 
development was at the heart of the reflection (i.e. development or under-
development as being at the origin of the "problem"). In 1980, the "World 
Conservation Strategy" (commissioned by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and released by the World Conservation Union, see 
IUCNIUNEPIWWF, 1980) talked about the problems posed by economic 
development rather than discussing the relationship between environment and 
development. But it gave little attention to the political, social or cultural dimensions 
of resource use and was criticized for describing a very Malthusian future, since it 
saw the root of environmental degradation in the increase of the population. As to 
the relation between economy and the environment, the Brundtland report, which 
defmed sustainable development for the first time, considered economic growth as a 
central element to environmental management, and that deteriorated environments 
were unfavourable to development (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). It also recognised that different patterns of consumption have a 
different impact on natural resources. So development and economic growth have 
always been at the centre of the reflection on sustainable development. While, in its 
public acceptation and in people's mind, this concept is strongly associated with the 
environment, in practice environmental considerations are generally not as a priority 
as economic growth. Hopwood et al. (2005) have classified the views of different 
actors on sustainable development according to their consideration for socio-
economic well being and equality on the one hand, and environmental issues on the 
other hand, as well as what they see as the necessary changes in society's political 
and economic structures (status quo, reform, transformation). While a simplification, 
their classification shows that the view shared by the most important and influential 
international actors (World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, European 
Union) are in favour of a status quo and that their conception of sustainable 
development does not lie on strong environmental and social concerns. Besides, 
Young (2002) considers that the consecration of this concept has not led to a major 
change in thinking: "World Bank's economic analysts and educators have continued 
to treat labour, capital and natural resources largely as mere variables on a graph, or 
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externalities to equilibrium models of idealised economic development - structurally 
neglecting the evolving complex reality" (p. 31). 
So the development discourse is technical, builds up the idea that we can 
manage the social and the environmental, and has strongly permeated into 
sustainable development. In view of the preceding discussion, it is considered that a 
managerial discourse possesses the following characteristics : 
• Identification of technical and anti-political problems; 
• Identification of technical and anti-political solutions; 
• Reliance on (economic, natural) science; 
• Lack of consideration for social aspects; 
• Implementation through technical and anti-political institutions. 
The next section shows that environmental problems and Climate Change follow 
this same trend and that a managerial discourse has gained hegemony. 
3.2 Climate Change as a Hegemonic Managerial Discourse 
Climate Change is the first ever challenge to the "western" way of life, and to 
consumption and production patterns based on an extensive and immoderate use of 
non renewable resources, notably fossil fuels. When the IPCC released its first 
report in 1990, pointing out that there was a real risk that human activities could 
affect the environment to a potentially very serious extent, it somehow attested that 
"Modernity" was the cause of major natural disturbances. It represents a challenge 
because mitigating its effects or limiting this phenomenon requires a move away 
from a fossil fuel based economy. This challenge could represent an opportunity to 
rethink production and consumption patterns. Instead, the problem has always been 
dealt in a technical way (as exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol economic tools such 
as Emission Trading Scheme and Clean Development Mechanisms), letting apart the 
fact that people may continue to have a destructive behaviour even if GHGs 
emissions were reduced, as advanced by Crist (2007). 
Until recently, the mitigation proponents opposed the adaptation ones, with 
the first ones refusing to consider the second option, fearing it would lead to a 
business-as-usual approach. The dominant discourse now is to favour both 
approaches. For example, the Climate Action Network (CAN), which groups 450 
NGOs worldwide and is proactive in the fight against Climate Change, clearly 
recognizes the two options and makes recommendations as to both mitigation and 
adaptation (Climate Action Network, 2009b). 
Development and environmental issues have always been thought as 
problems that can be resolved "through globally coordinated actions" (Adger et al. 
2001, p.682). In addition, they have merely been seen not as social phenomenon, but 
as highly technical ones. In the same way as development, the environment has 
always been considered as something we can "manage", which led to the creation of 
managerial institutions, such as the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), 
implemented under the auspices of the World Bank, which works in a "technical and 
businesslike" way (Young 2002). According to Young, political complexities are set 
apart and decisions taken within the GEF are highly bureaucratic: "politically loaded 
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issues are easier when treated as technical matters and solved from above without 
too many conflicting values and perspectives engaging in the discussion on equal 
terms" (p. 12). The GEF would in fact reinforce the "managerial attitude towards 
nature" (Escobar, 1996, p. 53). Young mentions "anti-politics technocrats" and a 
"depoliticised leadership", which consists in "avoiding challenges to tasks presented 
as technical" (2002, p. 182). This means that the politics inherent to any ecological 
decisions is completely wiped off. 
A good indicator of a reinforced managerial discourse is the involvement of 
actors, which themselves have a strong technical bias. The World Bank is in that 
respect an interesting actor to observe. It is the biggest multilateral donor. It plays an 
important role within the GEF, and was invited to be the trustee for the Green 
Climate Fund established in the Cancun agreements. Its consideration of Climate 
Change as a priority is recent, though. In a 1999 speech by James Wolfensohn 
(former World Bank President), Climate Change is mentioned as one issue among 
others, which can be dealt through the GEF: 
"We need to implement international agreements on climate change, 
desertification, and biological diversity, just like we did with ozone 
depletion. We must move to action on these global conventions. We must 
ensure that the Global Environment Facility is fully funded to do its 
work" (Wolfensohn, 1999). 
Five years later, it has become an "urgent priority", which calls for new and clean 
technologies, with renewable energy being a main concern (W olfensohn, 2004). But 
for the World Bank, climate is considered as "an economic issue" (Zoellick, 2008), 
carbon trading and new market mechanisms are among the advocated solutions, and 
the relationship between climate and growth is clearly stated: 
"[The] intelligent management of resources and the environment 
contributes to growth" (Wolfowitz, 2005). 
"Meet[ing] the challenge of climate change without slowing the growth 
[ ... ] will help to overcome poverty" (Zoellick, 2007). 
The 2010 World Development Report is itself devoted to Climate Change, which is 
presented as a threat to development. The solutions envisaged include natural 
resources management, energy provision, urbanization, social safety nets, 
international finance transfers, technological innovation, and governance (World 
Bank, 2009). The World Bank's practice somehow contradicts its stated concerns for 
Climate Change, as exemplified by the fmancing of a coal-powered power plant in 
India that will "emit more carbon dioxide annually than the nation of Tunisia" 
(Bulkeley and Newell, 2010: 52). 
As to the Climate Action Network, classified within the profligacy discourse 
by Adger et al., it seems that it shifted from a social-oriented approach to a 
managerial one. Indeed, the solutions it favours are now very technological, and no 
references to a change in the way oflife or in the economic order are made. It said in 
preparation to COP15 that "a set of global technology objectives" should be agreed 
upon, mentioned "climate risk insurance mechanisms", and advocated for a 
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"worldwide revolution in research, development and rapid diffusion of 
environmentally-sustainable technologies (EST), particularly renewable energy and 
energy efficiency" (Climate Action Network, 2009b ). Given that it represents almost 
500 international NGOs and that it is the focal point of the Environmental NGOs 
(ENGOs) within the UNFCCC, it plays an important role, benefits from a high 
visibility, and observing its positions is thus both relevant and instructive. Perhaps 
this shift is a strategic one: the CAN knows that if it wants to have an impact on 
negotiators, it has to be a "credible" interlocutor and to talk the same "language" 
and, consequently, make proposals that can be accepted. If this is the case, it is a 
supplementary indication of the supremacy of the managerial approach, because it 
would mean it can definitely not be challenged anymore. 
Developing countries themselves now concentrate all their efforts on the 
request for finance and technology, and do not advocate any more profound 
changes, with the exception of some anti-capitalist and Latin American countries, as 
exemplified by the organisation by Bolivia of the alternative Cochabamba World 
People's Conference on Climate Change in 2010. 
To this respect, the role played by science is crucial, and in the climate 
domain, social sciences are largely underrepresented. As economics is the dominant 
discipline in the development field (despite many anthropological studies, 
economics remain the development science and development projects are for most 
based on economic studies), natural sciences dominate the research on Climate 
Change, and, within social sciences, economy is also the prevailing one. It is 
obvious and not surprising, given the need to understand the global climate system 
and the impacts to be faced, but the understanding of the social, political and 
economic structures that lead to overuse, over-extraction and overconsumption, as 
well as the social impacts of Climate Change, are not as explored as they should be . 
. Bjurstrom and Polk (2011), analysing the IPCC third assessment report, conclude: 
"The research community consequently imposes a physical and economic 
bias that the JPCC reproduces in the policy sphere. [ ... ] This physical and 
economic bias distorts a comprehensive understanding of climate change. 
The weak integration of scientific fields hinders climate change from 
being fully addressed as an integral environmental and social problem". 
So the managerial discourse has gained a dominant position in the environmental 
and climate domains. Problems and solutions are defined in a technical manner, 
social aspects are let apart, identification of problems and solutions relies on science 
(study of natural and physical phenomena), and institutions involved are anti-
political. In fact, the way development itself is conceived (as a norm to be achieved 
following pre-determined steps, as advanced by Rostow, 1960) is influential of the 
whole way the functioning of the society is conceived, including its relation with the 
natural environment. 
4. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
According to some authors, the North-South divide would be obsolete (see for 
example Nigel, 1986; and more recently Robinson and Harris, 2000). Bradley and 
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Roberts (2008) showed, however, that the climate domain is characterized by several 
inequalities: 
• Inequality in responsibility; 
• Inequality in vulnerability; 
• Inequality in the emission reduction efforts; 
• Inequality in the international environmentat regimes; 
• Inequality in the international economic regimes. 
For several authors (Ikeme, 2003; Macaspac Penetrante, 2010; Muller, 2002), the 
North-South divide would have reinforced in the climatic domain because of the 
questions of fairness and equity. The major issues have indeed to do with who has to 
bear the cost of mitigation and adaptation measures, which is related to the very 
responsibility of countries (responsibility for past emissions and responsibility for 
current and future emissions). These questions are eminently linked to economic and 
development considerations. Macaspac Penetrante (20 1 0) rightly advances that the 
Copenhagen Conference somehow gave the impression that it was more about 
Africa's development than Climate Change. Developing countries claimed that they 
want to grow economically and to reduce poverty, and that they do not want their 
ability to do so to be challenged because of the reduction of GHGs and of the costs it 
would engender. Industrialised countries said they do not want to bear the costs 
alone and expected more efforts from emitter countries, and notably from China. 
China was the main target during COP15. It has now overtaken the United 
States as the world's largest producer of C02; so emission reduction efforts are 
expected from it. It announced before the Conference that it would cut its emissions 
of C02 per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020 from 2005 levels ("carbon 
intensity"), which, in other words, means that it has decided to slow down emission 
growth. China argues that it is not responsible for past emissions, that it is not a big 
GHGs emitter on a per capita basis and that its developing country status should be 
taken into consideration. A crucial issue indeed concerns China' s status as a 
developed or developing country: considered as a big economic power by the US, 
China advances that a large part of its population is still very poor. China is both a 
recipient and a provider of official development assistance, which testifies the 
ambiguity of its situation. 
In fact, as to the relationship between the North and the South, it looked like 
a double contradictory discourse had emerged after COP 15: On the one hand, since 
the beginning of the aid regime, countries have been classified according to their 
level of development and efforts have been made to help them "develop" and evolve 
from one level to another, generally through economic growth, considered as the 
way towards poverty reduction. On the other hand, developing countries have been 
criticized by industrialised countries for their lack of cooperation in the global 
emission reduction objective, precisely because of their very focus on economic 
development. So, one witnessed a double contradictory discourse of: 1) 
"Normalisation" of countries according to the same development levels (Germond-
Duret, 2010); and 2) Denunciation of developing countries, which want to focus on 
development first and are for this reason reluctant to contribute to the global effort. 
The merging of these two discourses inevitably leads to antagonisms, not only in 
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discourses but in practice as well. Differences of treatment between what is required 
from developing countries and what is done by industrialised countries also lead to 
tensions. For instance, nine Executive Directors wrote to the World Bank President 
Robert Zoellick in January 2010 protesting against the US declaring they would not 
support coal fired power generation projects in developing countries (while 
maintaining their own reliance on coal power). After decades having told developing 
countries they should follow the North's model to enjoy the same development 
level, the South has been now criticised for following this advice a bit too well. 
The Cancun Conference, however, gave the impression that the North-South 
divide was put aside. The "bad guys" were this time Japan and Russia, who rejected 
a second commitment period, and praised for an agreement that would include the 
US and China. And Parties managed to agree on the outcome of the conference, with 
the exception of Bolivia. 
Statements of Heads of States and Governments pronounced during the 
High Level Segments of the Cancun conference have been analyzed. The objective 
was to point out references to the following ideas on Climate Change and 
development: 
1. Development (ofthe North) as responsible for Climate Change; 
2. Poverty as responsible for Climate Change; 
3. Climate Change as a threat to Development; 
4. Development as the remedy to Climate Change; 
5. Development (of the South) as impeding emission reduction efforts; 
6. Fighting Climate Change as a way to promote Development; 
7. Fighting Climate Change as an obstacle to Development. 
140 statements were analysed, that is to say all the statements made available on the 
UNFCCC website minus the ones delivered in Arabic (for linguistic reasons). The 
idea was not to know how often development was mentioned but, when it was the 
case, how the relationship between Climate Change and development was 
envisaged. Therefore, the percentages presented in Figure 1 do not represent the 
number of statements that mention these ideas, but, among the statements 
mentioning development and Climate Change, the ones that mention the proposed 
ideas. Among the 140 statements analysed, a relationship between Climate Change 
and development was mentioned 85 times. 
The analysis shows that development remains a developing countries' 
concern. Indeed, the idea that Climate Change represents a threat to development 
was only mentioned by developing countries, with the exception of Australia and 
Switzerland. Australia mentioned that it understands the effects of Climate Change 
on water, weather and food production and that it will be affected too. Switzerland 
mentioned the economic cost associated with inaction, and the consequences m 
terms of water and food supplies as well as poverty in the South. 
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Figure 1. Statements mentioning Climate Change and Development in COP 16 's High Level Segment 
As to the development (of industrialised countries) as the cause of Climate Change, 
this idea was also mainly mentioned by developing countries, including China, as 
well as Cyprus ("developed countries have overexploited natural resources and 
therefore have the obligation to heavily invest in the mitigation and the reversal of 
the destruction of the natural environment"), Greece ("we have expanded production 
and consumption activities to the limits of the global ecosystem. We have created an 
environmental "bubble") and Sweden ("the rich world has laid claim to by far the 
greatest portion of the earth's natural resources and in effect has bought itself an 
economic standard at the cost of environmental destruction"). Fighting Climate 
Change is seen as an opportunity to promote development, or at least as not being in 
contradiction with a development process, by a range of different countries (Angola, 
Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Georgia, 
Germany, Guyana, Nepal, and Suriname). 
The Cancun conference was not as tense as the Copenhagen one, and 
developed and developing countries put their main divergences aside. A comparison 
of the statements pronounced by Andreas Carlgren, the Swedish Minister of the 
Environment, during the two conferences is quite revealing: 
COP15, Copenhagen, 2009: "At the [Stockholm] conference, India's 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi raised the question: 'Are not poverty and 
need the greatest polluters?' Mrs Gandhi confronted the world with the 
fact that poverty is both major cause and consequences of environmental 
degradation". 
COP 16, Cancun, 2010: "The poorest people, who are the least to blame 
for the problems, are affected first and worst". 
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So poverty was depicted as a cause of pollution in 2009, but the rhetoric had 
changed one year later with poverty being this time not considered as responsible for 
environmental degradations. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Development, and the North-South divide, has always been at the heart of 
international environmental concerns. The development discourse is technical and 
dominant and dictates the relationship between development and the environment. 
Climate Change is then dominated by a managerial discourse. A paradox is, 
however, emerging between the presumptions on which the aid regime is based on 
the one hand, and the industrialised countries' stances regarding developing 
countries and emission reduction efforts on the other hand. The North-South divide, 
prominent at Copenhagen, was not as visible at the Cancun conference, but 
development remains an important concern to developing countries. One of the 
reasons advanced to explain the relative success of COP16 is precisely the focus on 
technical questions. The depoliticisation of Climate Change may lead in the short 
term to constructive discussions (and we can see from the 2011 Bangkok conference 
that outcomes are positive so far) but discussions on obligations, and on the concrete 
impacts of the proposed reduction targets in terms of Climate Change, cannot be 
avoided further, as the end of the first commitment period is approaching. The 
peaceable discussions at Cancun do not erase the conflicting views on the post-
Kyoto regime, and divergences of opinion exist concerning the very Cancun 
agreements, seen either as good enough, or as a step towards a binding agreement, 
depending on countries' interests. 
The key element that will determine a potential long-lasting cooperation 
between industrialised and developing countries is the transfer of technology and 
financial resources. That question raises two issues. First, the realisation of the 
promises: For example, the fmancial assistance promised at Rio has never 
materialised, and in Cancun, several countries have denounced the fact that the fast-
track financing identified in Copenhagen has not been delivered. Second, the 
efficiency of such transfers: Over fifty years after the beginning of the aid regime, 
the results in terms of aid efficiency is less than satisfactory. It seems that we are 
heading towards a new development paradigm, which may soon even supplant the 
one of sustainable development, which is the "green growth" one. Initiatives such as 
the UNEP Green Economy (i.e. investing in clean technologies, renewable energies, 
green buildings, etc.) have gained support from a variety of different actors, 
including Greenpeace and the World Bank, and developing countries have endorsed 
the idea as well. The perspective of promoting economic growth while using 
renewable energy and lowering the reliance to fossil fuels is appealing and is now 
part of development agencies' rhetoric. But one needs to be cautious here. The 
development regime has been full of promises. Different vectors of development and 
different key motors and strategies have been identified along the years: investment 
in the industrial sector in the 1950s, investment in rural development and social 
services in the 1970s, structural adjustment in the 1980s, promotion of good 
governance in the 1990s and community engagement strategies more recently. But 
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the same challenges are still here, and progress towards reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals has been uneven so far. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis has highlighted the relations between the development discourse and 
the dominant Climate Change one, both reducing reality to simplified problem-
solution binomials and resulting from the same technical way of understanding 
society's fate and needs and its relation with the natural environment. In the context 
of the current climate negotiations, and the North and South conflicting views, one 
witnesses, however, an emerging paradox between the social practices required by 
the development discourse, and the obligations dictated by the Climate Change 
discourse. A contradictory double discourse has emerged, opposing the 
normalisation imperative (development) to the emission reduction effort imperative. 
The managerial discourse remains hegemonic and translates into politics. It 
ultimately reflects on people, shape their knowledge and ideas. 
These reflections raise the following question: What can oppose the 
hegemonic managerial discourse? What can challenge this way of constructing 
reality in the modem era? These questions open the way to further research on the 
drivers of dominant ideas, on discourses hegemony, and on the . conditions for 
change. 
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